Thursday December 21 in room A822 at 15:00
Title: Political Economy of Making an Authoritarian Constitution: The Case of China (with Di Guo, Kun Jiang and Yutong Wang)



This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the political economy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s constitutional transformation from totalitarian to authoritarian more than a decade ago. The premise of our theory is that the rational of the Party is centered on its power, which relies on the support of social elites in the economy. When an economy is in transition, who are the elites is in change. From the Party’s stand, a totalitarian constitution may become suboptimal under that situation. Making an authoritarian constitution may create conditions for maintaining the Party’s power. Our theoretical predictions are supported by empirical evidence/tests based on Chinese data at firm level, provincial level and national level, during the period of 2002/2004 party/state constitutional changes. Our theory also shed lights for understanding seemingly backward changes in related areas after a decade.




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